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This essay argues that there are reasons why all groups, including feminists 
and those who are critical of forms of fundamentalism, need a perspective 
of universal humanity. Universalism is important because it is a view about 
the shared characteristics of all humans. It is particularly necessary to 
reiterate that there are such qualities in a world where ugly divisions 
between groups have once again become apparent. Universalism is also a 
normative perspective – a view that there are principles of justice that 
require that each person, whoever and wherever they are, is treated fairly 
and equally. With appropriate qualifications, I suggest that universal 
nature can be understood in terms of needs, or indeed of rights, so long as 
the limitations of the latter are appreciated. The essay responds to 
criticisms of a universalist perspective--from the post-modern to the view 
that universalism is invariably a false generalisation from a partial point of 
view. I suggest that sometimes these positions misrepresent universalism. 
At other times, though, they make better sense if they are construed as 
presupposing a universalist perspective. 
Keywords: Universalism; post-modernism; intersectionality; justice; 
needs; rights; feminism; fundamentalism. 
 
In my 2003 book Revisiting Universalism, I defended a universalising 
perspective, a view that suggests that there are political and moral 
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imperatives deriving from the fact of our universal humanity. In this essay, 
I will argue that there are reasons why all groups, including feminists and 
those who are critical of forms of fundamentalism, need a perspective of 
universal humanity. Given, however, that many theorists have challenged 
universalism, I will spend some time responding to critics of the viewpoint. 
I will then move to consider some alternative theoretical perspectives, 
including feminist outlooks, that have been offered as countering 
universalism. In the course of this, I will suggest, contrary to the view of 
some post-modern feminists, that there are also reasons, in certain 
circumstances, for defending a notion of universal ‘woman’. 
  What do we mean by ‘universalism’ about humans? We mean a view 
that there are broad shared characteristics of humanity. But universalism 
is important because it is also a normative perspective – a view that there 
are principles of justice that require that each person, whoever and 
wherever they are, is treated fairly and equally. Human beings have, as 
Martha Nussbaum has put it (1995, 5): ‘a dignity that deserves respect 
from laws and social institutions’. Respecting human dignity might entail 
drawing up a set of human needs or rights deriving from these and 
respecting these. Included amongst those needs or rights that are either 
basic or very important would be the right to life, the right to decent food 
and shelter and the right to freedom from persecution. The satisfaction of 
basic needs is necessary to ensure human flourishing. This point might be 
made in terms of needs or in terms of capabilities but, with appropriate 
qualifications, to be adumbrated below, and as outlined above, it could be 
conceptualised in terms of some notion of a right. Underlying the notion 
of a right is the view that individuals are entitled to respect as moral agents 
capable of making choices. Moreover, while the notion of a right is in fact 
associated with liberal citizenship, it is possible to re-think the notion in a 
fashion that may be more in accord with a genuine conception of universal 
humanity. 
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 In my personal view, which I have defended elsewhere,1 a universal 
perspective is best defended in terms of the common nature shared by all 
of the members of humanity. This common nature is a rich and diverse one 
and it suggests our deep connection with the rest of the natural world. This 
shared nature need not be an exclusively objective one. As Françoise 
Lionnet (1991, 2-3, 4) has suggested in her deeply engaging discussion of 
FGM, a universalist perspective on the body need not ‘objectify the other’. 
Rather it is possible to suggest a form of universalism that creates a space 
where ‘inter-subjectivity and reciprocity become possible’. Lionnet argues 
that the discourses on FGM of both early feminists and some of the more 
recent post-colonial theorists are misleading. She contends that 
accusations of ‘western imperialism’ and African barbarism are both 
empirically wrong and that each underplays African opposition to the 
practice. 
 
 In 2003 I argued that one central reason why it is important to defend 
a universalist theory about human beings is to characterise the shared 
humanity of, for example, the poorest person in the world and the richest 
person. Economic injustice is perhaps one of the most extreme types of 
injustice. A recent Oxfam report, from January 2015, suggests that the 
richest 1% will own more than all the rest by the year 2016 (Slater 2015). 
These figures themselves are enough to give any of us pause for thought. 
The Ebola outbreak illustrates, indeed, the kinds of threat posed even to 
the richest in the world by these damaging levels of inequality. A virus of 
this kind does not distinguish rich from poor, although, of course, the rich 
are likely to have access to health care that is unavailable to the poor. 
Unless the richest recognise their shared humanity with the poorest, then 
the poorest are liable to be written off as either implicitly not human at all 
or as possessing some inferior form of humanity. Extreme levels of 
inequality anyway, are detrimental to the well-being of all (see Wilkinson 
1996). Economic and political instability, consequences of extreme levels 
of inequality, are detrimental, in the long run, even to the interests of the 
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rich. One can make parallel kinds of points though, about other areas of 
difference, including sex and gender differences, between groups of 
people. The World Economic Forum reports annually on a range of 
inequalities between men and women and suggests that these are 
significant across a range of indicators – including pay for similar jobs, 
educational attainment, political empowerment and health and survival 
(see Hausmann et al 2014). 
 A further example of an injustice is the denigration of the female body 
in certain forms of fundamentalism. While it is important for me as a white 
western woman to be careful not to offer an ‘orientalist’ or a western 
perspective on Islam, it is also necessary to point out injustices 
perpetrated by ‘fundamentalist’ forms of religion. One writer, Mariam 
Poya, an Iranian and Muslim woman, reserves the term ‘fundamentalism’ 
for a version of Islam that is about ‘absolute control over the female body 
and mind’ (Poya 2000). It is a normative perspective of universal humanity 
that allows us to see this as an injustice. 
 Of course, even these claims involve what might seem a paradoxical 
challenge to universalism. If some groups challenge universalism then how 
can a universalist outlook be applied to them? How can I claim an 
attachment to universalism on the part of the very groupings that set out 
to challenge the notion? However, those groups need to recognise the 
importance of universalism if humanity is to flourish. Social and cultural 
groupings do not live in isolation from one another. 
 
Some common criticisms of universalism and some responses 
Some of the above claims about the significance of universalism might 
seem obvious. But the basic position has been criticised from a number of 
different perspectives. One criticism of universalism concerns its scope. 
So, to take one example of this criticism, in his important monograph, The 
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Black Atlantic, that argued for a cross diasporic conception of ‘black 
identity’ against an Enlightenment ideal that was partially constructed on 
a premise of slavery, Paul Gilroy wrote (1993, 43): ‘incredulous voices have 
drawn attention to the bold, universalist claims of occidental modernity 
and its hubristic confidence in its own infallibility’. Gilroy’s work, alongside 
that of others, has demonstrated the exclusionary nature of certain 
Enlightenment concepts. Some Enlightenment thinkers actually excluded 
women and certain races from the scope of the notion of a right, and, more 
significantly, as noted above, Gilroy’s work demonstrates how slavery was 
in fact part and parcel of certain elements of the Enlightenment ideal.2 
Human universality, then, has been seen as an Enlightenment conceit; it 
has been viewed as inevitably presupposing the imposition of purportedly 
and falsely ‘universal’ values on those falling outside its invariably 
European and white norm. 
 This point has also been expressed in a slightly different form by those 
who have argued that the very idea of a civic public which is implicit in 
universalising thinking excludes groups defined as different (see Young 
1989, 250-74). The notion of a republic or of citizenship, it has been 
argued, is always implicitly racialised or sexed. Such a critique of 
universalism, however, might indicate that the ‘universal’ outlook against 
which the comment inveighs, is not genuinely universal. Moreover, the 
criticism probably assumes, with its reference to ‘Enlightenment conceit’, 
that universalism is to be conceptualised in terms of the discourse of 
human rights. 
 Radically different thinkers, ranging from the Marxist inspired 
intellectuals Horkheimer and Adorno in the Dialectic of Enlightenment 
(2002)3 to the defender of certain religious communities, Saba Mahmood 
(2011),  have critiqued the notion of a right and damned the liberal self 
with faint praise. Horkheimer and Adorno argued that the domination of 
nature by humans and of one group of humans by another is endemic in 
Enlightenment thinking and that the discourse of human rights is core to 
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this frame. Horkheimer and Adorno suggested that progressive forces, in 
Enlightenment discourse, are undermined by the links between the 
enlightenment commitment to freedom and equality and capitalist 
excesses.4 This work poses a challenge to the normative assumptions 
underlying the liberal conception of the self.5 
 There is not the space in an article of this kind to respond properly and 
in depth to these significant challenges to liberal thinking. However, it is 
possible to respond that these interpretations of the notion of a ‘right’ 
suggest not that the concept itself, or its underlying values, is problematic 
but that its associations, with capitalism, individualism, sexism and racism 
represent inappropriate and partial interpretations of the notion. The 
notion of a right, if it is understood in a genuinely universal way, need not 
be viewed in terms of Enlightenment autonomy, with its ready association 
with individualism and its denial of the interconnectedness of humanity. 
One might note, moreover, that the conceptualisation of freedom, to take 
one value-laden concept, often associated solely with the Enlightenment, 
is core also to ancient Greek thinking. Hannah Arendt, for example, in her 
magnum opus, The Human Condition (1958), drawing on the ancient 
Greeks, emphasises how true action of human beings – for example 
political activity that recognises and depends upon the activity of others – 
requires some notion of freedom. In fact, for her, the modern world is 
characterised by the denial of this form of action, action that ought to 
characterise a feature of humanity as distinct from animality. 
 Moreover, having available to us, in our contemporary globalised 
world, a notion of universal humanity does not mean that we ignore the 
cultural, religious, sexed and racialised aspects of our identities as humans. 
If the notion of a right, therefore, were genuinely founded upon a 
conception of universal humanity, or on the needs and the flourishing, 
appropriately construed, of such a universal humanity, then it would not 
fall foul of these objections. 
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 It is true, to reiterate points that have frequently been made, that 
specific exemplifications of human rights, as enshrined in legal 
constitutions and in the conceptions of citizenship deployed by particular 
nations, often fail to promote universal standpoints. Frequently the rights 
that are enshrined in the various legal systems, even of purported 
democracies all over the world, violate the notion of equal respect. 
Sometimes laws and institutions themselves perpetuate inequalities on 
grounds of sex or race, class or religious affiliation.6 It is also important to 
mention those individuals who are stateless and who don’t therefore have 
the protection of the law anywhere. Migrants often don’t have ‘rights’ at 
least expressed in the form of citizenship of some state, anywhere. In the 
UK, ‘terror suspects’ are increasingly defined as being ‘outside’ the 
universal convention that allows them at the very least the right to life and 
the right not to be tortured. There are also extreme zones of exception 
such as Guantanamo Bay set up by the US government as part of its ‘war 
on terror’ policy. 
 But, to reiterate the point once more, these expressions of the 
limitation of the notion of a right do not mean that we should reject 
altogether the discourse or the concept of universalism. It doesn’t follow 
from the fact of the imperfect application of principles of universal rights 
that the notion of universal rights itself ought to be rejected, nor does it 
follow that the concept itself is racist or Eurocentric or sexist. 
Although, therefore, the concept of a ‘right’ as it is often 
interpreted, is flawed and is an imperfect tool, it is nonetheless a vitally 
important one. The significance of it, even in the liberal terms articulated 
in the Universal Convention, is highlighted by the recent threat, in the UK, 
to the Human Rights Act. The Conservative government in the UK at 
present is considering seceding from the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
 Returning, then, to the claim of Gilroy, Gita Sahgal (2014, 67-83), for 
one, has forcefully challenged the view that a secular universalist human 
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rights perspective stems exclusively from European Enlightenment values 
and a European context. Indeed, she has argued that the movement in 
India that challenged the twin ills of colonialism and fundamentalist 
Hinduism was, and still is, the universalising discourse of human rights.7 
Moreover, and relatedly, Chetan Bhatt (2006, 98-115) has critiqued the 
ready association of non-western with ‘victim’ and ‘other’. He suggests an 
association of this with the simultaneous denial both of full subject-hood 
to the ‘subaltern’ or the ‘non-western’ and of the possibility that some 
such ‘victims’ might themselves also be attacking, for example, the secular 
spaces of Asian peoples. 
 Finally, on this point, Neil Lazarus and Rashmi Varma (2008), make the 
following point: ‘From the Haitian Revolution of the late eighteenth 
century to the Indian freedom struggle of the mid-twentieth, from 
Toussaint L’Ouverture’s challenge to French ideas of citizenship to 
Gandhi’s strategic ironisation of ‘Western civilisation’ as a ‘good idea’ (his 
tongue-in-cheek suggestion, of course, was that it would be a good idea if 
the West were to become civilised!), the history of anticolonial struggle is 
replete with instances not of ‘alternative modernity’ but of claims made 
to civic rights, freedom and citizenship on the ground of modernity’ (326). 
 
Atomistic individualistic ‘pseudo’ universalism 
A second criticism, along similar though differently conceived lines to that 
of Gilroy, claims that a ‘universalist’ perspective is a chimera – it rests on 
a god’s eye view of the world that is simply unattainable. So, for example, 
critics of Rawls’8 self – the self that negotiates about norms from behind a 
‘veil of ignorance’ – claim that such a self is a fiction. A ‘universal’ self is 
such a watered-down self that there is nothing left. Moreover, the ‘liberal’ 
universalist relies, it is said, also, on an ‘individual’ notion of the self, that 
is isolated from its communities, its cultures and its traditions. 
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‘Liberal’ and other political thinkers therefore countered universalism 
with communitarianism. In its communitarian version, liberal pluralists 
suggested that a community or a society is important for a moral theory 
to have practical force. Waltzer (1983) and Taylor (1992), for example, 
claimed that it is vital that we stay rooted in our communities in order to 
make sense of our shared ethical values. The self, according to this 
argument, is always ‘encumbered’ in its traditions, its cultural norms and 
its communities and it is these ‘encumbrances’ that form the basis for its 
values. As Gideon Calder has put it (2006, 5), ‘every universalism masks a 
particularism’. Post-modernists, post-colonial theorists, some feminists 
and others advise us to focus on our differences, to celebrate our diversity. 
Many in western liberal democracies responsible for the policy enactment 
of views like this therefore developed policies that prioritised the values 
of communities.9 
 There is an important general point to make about this, however. First 
of all, while ‘particularists’ claim that the universalist cannot specify what 
it is that is universal in humanity, the universalist will counter that 
‘particularists’ suffer from the same difficulty. For ‘particularists’ it is 
equally difficult to specify what form the ‘encumbrances’ ought to take.10 
So Rorty, for example, on the one hand, throughout his work, has 
expressed concerns about potentially false universalising perspectives, 
about any normative view that purports to be universal but that might not 
be. One should, he writes, ‘face(s) up to the contingency of his or her own 
most central beliefs and desires’ (1989, xv). On the other hand, he claims, 
one must also create some kind of solidarity with others. But, the 
universalist might ask, what does this ‘solidarity’ mean and with whom? 
With a nation, for example; with a particular culture? Why? What about 
those excluded from the scope of the nation or the culture? 
 A central difficulty for this view of Rorty’s is that it is difficult, without 
recourse to some notion, however nuanced, of universal humanity, for this 
sense of solidarity to be anything other than arbitrary. It will become 
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either a local community or a nation, or a cultural grouping and the 
question will arise in relation to each of these – why should we prioritise 
any one of them? In the end Rorty, indeed, himself reverts back to a notion 
of universality – a conception of universal vulnerability. Humans, for 
example, are frail beings subject to pain. 
Moreover, and equally importantly, the view that the universal self is 
an unencumbered ‘mind’ that exists everywhere and no-where seems to 
rest upon a metaphysical view of the self that is ultimately in some sense 
Cartesian – the self as a ‘mind’ that has, as Kant pointed out, no identifying 
characteristics other than the fact of its thinking. But the universal self 
does not have to be construed this way. It can instead be viewed as a living, 
active, embodied self that is differentiated from other animals and from 
the rest of the natural world by its ability to devise norms and by its 
particular type of consciousness. The norms devised by such a self may 
change but they must include a constant and vigilant concern to protect 
the rights and abilities of all human beings, wherever they find themselves 
and with whomever they associate in their relations with others. 
 Thus universalism does not have to depend on a God’s eye conception 
of the human self. The parameters of the human are fluid – technology in 
all its forms, for example, shapes what we know and count as human – but 
the human is always embodied and finite, rather than being, as the critics 
assume it to be, a strangely disembodied mind. In the end, then, this 
criticism of universalism is no different from the one expressed by Gilroy, 
since it identifies, mistakenly I am suggesting, all forms of universalism 
with the ‘Enlightenment conceit’. 
 
Criticism of the notion of justice 
It is important also to mention those critics who have associated the very 
principle of justice with the Enlightenment conceit. So, for example, 
feminist political theorists have argued that the notion of justice itself 
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depends upon an inappropriate view of the self. Carol Pateman, for 
example, in her major and significant work The Disorder of Women: 
Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory (1989, 3), argued that the very 
discipline of political theory ‘systematically excluded’ the question of 
women from its frame of reference because it was based on the 
conception of a public citizen that excludes the private realm of the family. 
Feminist political theory, since the publication of that text, has been 
engaging in responding to this point either by re-thinking the notion of the 
‘public’ or by extending some of the aspects of citizenship into the private 
sphere. Extensive feminist work, for example, has been done on domestic 
violence issues.11  
 But the point has also been made that the principle of justice depends, 
in the words of Iris Marion Young, on an ideal of impartiality that is the 
‘same for all rational agents’ (1990, 100).12 Young argues that developing 
principles of justice requires a point of view that abstracts from 
particularity, from context and from emotion. This, however, according to 
her, involves an inappropriate denial of difference or ‘alterity’ amongst 
subjects – differences arising from situation, context and other aspects of 
individuality. The ideal of normative reason, according to her, necessarily 
underplays differences between subjects. Deploying principles of justice, 
then, on this argument, necessarily leaves out important characteristics 
that differentiate humans from one another. 
 Young’s argument is an important and a strong one. One way of reading 
it, however, is that it associates principles of justice with the form of 
universalism – the atrophied self – that has been critiqued in the previous 
section of this article. But secondly, Young seems to go further and claim 
that universalism is impossible because of the logic of identity that it 
presupposes. Every concept has an opposite. If, for example, the universal 
concept is reason, then it necessarily excludes emotion. However, as I have 
argued before, characterising humans in a minimal sense does not entail 
that they are only and exclusively that minimum. As argued previously, 
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describing human beings in terms of a universal nature or a universal form 
of reasoning does not mean that they are not also emotional, culturally 
embedded etc. So the criticism of the ideal of justice then, depends in part 
on a critique of a conception of universalism that has already itself been 
challenged in an earlier section of this article. 
A Response to one further criticism of universalism 
Moving now specifically to some feminist critics of a form of universalism, 
but a universalism now about women, post-modern inspired feminists 
challenged their early second-wave sisters. Their main criticism of the 
latter paralleled the above challenge to universal humanity. It was that 
many of the claims that purported to be universally true of women were 
in fact true only for women of particular classes, races and cultures. 
Abortion on demand, for example, was not a demand that those women 
undergoing forced contraception could relate to. Post-modern feminists, 
then, suggest that the early feminists unconsciously and falsely 
universalised from their own perspectives. These criticisms followed on 
the heels of the earlier feminists’ insistence that their male counterparts 
had universalised from their own partial perspective. Some post-modern 
inspired feminists therefore concluded that there are no ‘essential’ or 
‘universal’ characteristics of women. 
 In this vein, post-modern feminists argued that feminist theory must 
be ‘explicitly historical’ and ‘non universalist’ (Fraser and Nicholson 1990, 
19-38). One significant pair of writers on the subject, Linda Nicholson and 
Nancy Fraser, criticised earlier feminists on the ground that their theories 
were ‘essentialist and mono-causal’. They also described universalising 
theories, in Lyotardian vein, as ‘quasi metanarratives’ (ibid., 27). As 
another writer on the subject put it: such theories falsely universalised 
features of the theorists’ own ‘era, society, culture, class, sexual 
orientation, and ethnic or racial group’. In fact, to give one example, these 
writers argued ‘there are no common areas of experience between the 
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wife of a plantation owner in the pre-Civil War south and the female slaves 
her husband owns’.13 
 Post-modern feminists, then, as noted, drew on the work of Lyotard. In 
his classic text on the subject, The Postmodern Condition (1979), Lyotard 
had objected to the ‘foundationalism’ implicit in what he labelled ‘grand 
narratives’ as well as to their Enlightenment inspired and falsely optimistic 
faith in progress. In response to this, however, firstly, Lyotard’s critique of 
the notion of a ‘grand narrative’ has not gone unchallenged.  His 
description of contemporary science as being concerned with ‘paradox, 
fracture, catastrophe’ has been questioned (see Rorty, Habermas and 
Lyotard in Bernstein 1985, 163). Secondly, it is important to note that it is 
possible to believe in a universal theory without upholding a 
foundationalist epistemology (the desire to place knowledge on claims 
that are known with certainty). Thirdly, and most importantly for the 
present issue, it is, to reiterate the point, possible to uphold a universalist 
outlook about women, as well as about humanity more generally, without 
falsely generalising from one’s own perspective. As Margaret Whitford 
once put it (1991, 5), feminist membership is like Merleau-Ponty’s heap of 
sand: each grain individually is minute and slightly different from all the 
others, but the whole sandbank may block a river.14 
 ‘Woman’ is multiple; there are many classes of women, many races and 
many sexual orientations.  Perhaps each one of these has come into being 
as the result of a number of processes or as the expression of a number of 
powers. Some of these powers are biological; some are social. However, 
universality in the following sense is undeniable. Each kind of thing is 
categorised on the basis of shared characteristics of that kind. It would be 
impossible to categorise anything at all unless this were the case. The 
category human and the category woman are no different. It doesn’t 
follow from the claim that all women are different that we must celebrate 
differences and deny universality. Moreover, the category ‘woman’ can 
also be used normatively, in an analogous fashion to that of humanity, to 
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critique unjust practices amongst women. There may be disagreements 
about what constitutes an injustice – abortion on demand may be 
perceived as a right by some women and not by others. Yet there are cases 
– FGM for example – where the practice would be agreed by many women 
to constitute an injustice against women. It is a recognition, once more, of 
shared membership of the universal that allows for this. 
 Some post-modern inspired feminists, it is arguable, in their desire to 
denigrate what was called hetero-normativity may have thrown out the 
ability to theorise male power.15 The ontological conception of the human 
which is at least partially biologically formed, needs to be reinstated. This 
point has been made recently by Elizabeth Grosz (2011), who argues that 
it is Irigaray who recognises the huge significance of the division between 
the sexes in any ontology. It is notably Irigaray, according to Grosz, who 
has focussed on the ontological reality of sexual difference, sexual 
difference as a mode of being,16 rather than a pair of objects that is 
discovered in the world. For Irigaray, reflecting Darwin, nature itself is 
sexed – it is at least two.17 This division, according to Irigaray, cuts across 
all living beings, and is the condition for the emergence, in the human, of 
all other differences. An appreciation of this point does not mean that it is 
not also important to recognise the phenomenological experience of 
individual women. It is very important not to impose on, for example, the 
experience of someone who has undergone FGM, a point of view that is 
not derived from that experience. The vivid account of the phenomenon 
offered, for example, by Nawal El Saʻdāwī, in A Daughter of Isis (1999), 
viscerally conveys the horror of the experience for her and could not be 
conveyed by someone who had not experienced FGM. 
 Biologically sexed bodies are also socially inflected. Moreover, biology 
itself may be subject to norms. But it does not follow from this that the 
biological and the social are reducible to one another. A universalist 
inspired criticism of some post-modern feminists, then, which is also a 
criticism of the ‘false’ version of universalism critiqued by Gilroy and 
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others, is that they may underplay biological bodily identity. Even if this 
view about biology is not accepted, it remains the case that, for normative 
reasons, there is a universal category ‘woman’. 
 
‘Identity’ politics 
For certain post-modernist feminists and for the early Rorty, although they 
conceive of identity differently from one another, all of us are, in some 
crucial sense, defined by our ‘identity’. This identity may be performatively 
constructed, as it is with Butler, or simply given. For Judith Butler (1990 
and elsewhere), for example, at least in so far as she has been read by 
some, identities can be made and re-made through performance. For 
some readings of her work and for the early Rorty, though, identities are 
both ‘foundational’ and, simultaneously, they express the normative 
interests of subjugated groupings. 
 I would like to note at the outset that the notion of identity is a very 
important one in certain contexts. There needs to be institutional 
recognition of oppressed groups. As Iris Marion Young has put it, ‘a 
person’s particular sense of history, understanding of social relations and 
personal possibilities, her or his mode of reasoning, values, and expressive 
styles are constituted at least partly by her or his group identity’ (1990, 
259). 
 But there are ‘universalist’ comments one can make about this 
theoretical perspective that assumes that ‘identity’ is paramount. One 
criticism is this: a point that is not often noted, to take one example, is that 
an investment in ‘black’ identity carries with it a counter investment in 
‘white’ identity – in the US ‘whiteness’ appears to provide one with access 
to resources, power and opportunity (Lipsitz 2006). Yet whiteness is less 
frequently discussed than blackness in the elaborations of ‘identity’ 
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politics. As Richard Wright put it when asked about his view of the ‘Negro’ 
problem, ‘there isn’t a negro problem; there is only a white problem’.18 
 To express what is problematic about this: identity politics may only 
represent the interests of the grouping rather than remedying injustice. 
This is not to deny that these interests are very important and that political 
activity on the basis of these interests has been what has drawn attention, 
for example, to the issue of racism. Identity is also important for the 
recognition of the group. 
 However, it is also the case that it is an injustice rather than merely in 
the interests of black people that black people in the US, for example, are 
poorer than white people. A specific illustration of the problem of interests 
is that there is sometimes ‘interest convergence’ between a powerful and 
a disadvantaged group e.g. the case of de-segregation: it was initially in 
the interest of some whites to oppose segregation for economic reasons 
(it would favour development) rather than because segregation is racist 
and wrong. But this wholly ignores the problem of the injustice of 
disadvantage. Framing politics in the form of identities fractures the civil 
polity and fails to create opportunities for ending marginalization. Black 
inequality is an issue for all, rather than merely being one for black people. 
It requires a perspective of shared humanity and of justice to see that black 
inequality is unjust. Although it took a specific group to point this out, the 
injustice must be an issue for all. 
 A third difficulty is that problematic versions of the political position 
arise when a defence of the ‘identity’ of any one of these groupings 
becomes either a failure to recognise multiple forms of oppression, on the 
one hand, or, more controversially, circumstances when individuals or 
groups within such identified collectivities become themselves 
oppressors. Communities, in general, are important when they allow for 
the flourishing of all. Where they work against this, then they cease to be 
valuable. The identity of being Jewish, or Christian, for example, while it is 
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important in representing the interests of Jews or Christians, may gloss 
over inequalities and injustices within the collectivity.  
 Moreover, the focus on identity omits reference to areas of existence 
that are outside the control of the subject. Elizabeth Grosz, referred to 
earlier, seeks to problematize the focus in much contemporary feminist 
philosophy, on identity. She suggests that the concern, in much feminist 
theory, with the subject’s feelings, identity, affects, agencies and energies 
and related issues, leaves out the ‘rest of existence’ – what is outside the 
subject or outside the control of the subject. 
Inter-sectionality 
There has been a popular theoretical response to the perceived limitations 
of ‘identity politics’ which has become known as ‘inter-sectionality’. This 
term was coined by Kimberle Crenshaw (1991, 1241-1299), who is an 
African American critical legal theorist. According to inter-sectionality 
theory, people are constructed, as Sukhwant Dhaliwal and Nira Yuval Davis 
write (2014, 35): ‘along multiple (and both shifting and contingent) axes of 
difference, such as gender, class, race and ethnicity, stage in the life cycle, 
sexuality, ability and so on’. The intersections are not simply added 
together but rather they constitute each other, so it is impossible for any 
individual, according to the theory, to be identified by means of any sub-
set of the categories. 
 I would like simply to pose some questions about this theoretical 
approach. First of all, how do we know where to draw the line? How many 
‘inter-sectional characteristics’ are allowed or perhaps more importantly, 
how many should be taken into consideration at any one time? How do 
we determine which characteristics are politically significant? Most of the 
contributors to the debate refer to the ‘intersections’ of class, race and 
sex. But are these the only kinds of division that are politically significant? 
Could one include, for example, religion or culture? How would the 
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inclusion of these additional categories affect the way in which the ‘social 
divisions’ are conceived and would it affect how they interact? 
 Is it possible to explain, for example, sexism within a particular religion 
in terms of the ‘intersection’ of divisions?  Is it not clearer to explain such 
a practice simply as unjust? Does it not require a view that there is a 
universal humanity and that all should be treated fairly and well, to see 
this? 
 Inter-sectionality theorists critiqued early feminist ‘dual systems’ or 
‘triple systems’ theories on a couple of grounds: sometimes sex and race 
operate together to produce a form of oppression that is distinct from 
either race or sex oppression separately. It is also said that gender 
relations are formed inside class relations and this is thought further to 
undermine the notion of them being separate systems. 
 But it doesn’t follow just because gendering takes place inside class 
relations that gender is not a separable theoretical ‘system’ from class. It 
also doesn’t follow, as I have argued earlier, just because each one of us is 
comprised of many intersecting and variable characteristics, that we 
cannot also be characterised in the terms that all of us share. But more 
importantly, the same kind of point can be made about this theory as was 
put earlier about identity theory. While the notion of intersecting systems 
of gender and race for example plays a useful methodological role in 
enabling certain kinds of research, policy and activism, if we are 
concerned, by contrast, to emphasise the injustices committed against 
certain groups or individuals through the intersection of, for example, 
oppression based on sex and race, we require a universalising outlook to 
make sense of this as an injustice. Discrimination against a person on 
grounds of the ‘inter-section’ of race and sex involves a dual injustice. It is 
a universalising perspective that allows us to make sense of this. Inter-
sectionality, then, presupposes a universalising perspective. 
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‘Oppressors’ within marginal groupings 
Moreover, neither identity politics nor inter-sectionality without 
universalism can address the equally important question of those who are 
‘oppressed’ in certain circumstances becoming ‘oppressors’ in others. So, 
while it is the case that racism in general or ‘racism’ against Muslims or 
other religious groupings, or discrimination against Christians (expressed 
in many parts of the Middle East and elsewhere today) are each unjust and 
oppressive practices, it is also true that fundamentalist forms of religion 
are themselves oppressive and unjust and ought to be condemned. 
A seriously problematic interpretation of communitarianism or identity 
politics, therefore, is when ‘community’ values, like, for example, 
reactionary and extreme views about gay people or about women, are 
allowed to reign unchecked within certain ‘communities’ or are allowed to 
represent the ‘identity’ of the community. Such cases obviate the reason 
for community or multi-cultural values being significant in the first place. 
Communitarianism or multi-culturalism, to reiterate, are significant when 
they work to promote the flourishing of all. When they cease to do this, 
they cease to have this value. As Pragna Patel (2013) has pointed out, (self-
appointed) community leaders often become the spokespeople and 
therefore the ‘authentic voice’ of certain communities and this is harmful 
to less powerful groups within those communities. Patel speaks of the way 
in which the religious right in certain ‘ethnic minority’ communities in the 
UK has been granted representative status. One extreme example of the 
effect of this is the furore surrounding the play Behzti, a play about sexual 
and ‘honour’ based violence in a Sikh temple. The play exposed corruption 
and abuse of power within the Sikh community. The play was pulled by the 
Birmingham Repertory company in the face of protests from within the 
Sikh community. These community members attacked the play citing the 
ground of religious hatred, forcing the author, herself a Sikh, to go into 
hiding. 
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 As Patel also points out, the religious right is on the rise at the same 
time as racism towards minorities and especially Muslims is on the 
increase. This illustrates, to reiterate again, the need for a universalist 
perspective: It is only a belief that both anti-Muslim racism and anti-sexism 
within so-called ‘Muslim’ communities are unjust, that allows and indeed 
requires all of us to condemn both. It is also these beliefs that form the 
basis for political action that can unite people across communities and 
identities. 
 A case that fascinated me was the view of a Muslim woman from the 
Sudan who expressed her shock at the right-wing versions of Islam held 
within some Muslim communities in the UK.19 Perhaps right-wing versions 
of religion have been allowed to flourish at least partly because of 
practices on the part of many in the UK of inappropriate applications of 
multi-culturalist and ‘community’ forms of pluralism. In their desire not to 
fall foul of the supposed Enlightenment conceit, well-meaning non-
universalist liberals may have inadvertently allowed pernicious and right-
wing values to take root in some of the multi-cultural communities they 
argued should be tolerated. 
It is important to note, of course, that ‘right-wing’ values within 
communities specifically in the UK have also been tolerated in cases like 
working men’s clubs (some of which still exclude women) or, at the other 
extreme ‘gentlemen’s clubs’. 
 In this context, it is again a universalising perspective that recognises 
our collective shared humanity and the needs and rights that stem from 
this, that is the best theoretical approach to adopt. A universalising 
perspective at least recognises a number of key and core rights – the right 
to be free from religion as equal to the right to practise religion, the right 
to be treated equally as well as rights to be free from racism, sexism, anti-
Muslim racism and homophobia. It is on the basis of our shared humanity 
that it is possible to theorise a perspective that recognises all of these as 
rights. Racism denies the humanity of those affected by it. Anti-Muslim 
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racism may be different but, in its extreme variants, it tends to damn all 
Muslims as right-wing fundamentalists. Failure to recognise the rights of 
cartoonists to lampoon religious characters, the rights of all to be free from 
religious persecution, the rights of all to be free from sexism is a failure to 
recognise the rights of all to flourish as individuals and as groups. 
 It is a universalising perspective about humanity that allows us to 
recognise that crimes against humanity have been committed by powers, 
like, for example, Saudi Arabia as well as by states like the USA. One lesser 
known such crime is the collusion of the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Pakistani 
army against secular nationalists and religious minorities in 1971 (Sahgal 
2014). Indeed, it may be the denial of the possibility of a universalising 
perspective that leads some in the west to castigate as racist white people 
who set out to critique such practices. As noted earlier, leftist 
‘multiculturalism’ has encouraged the naming of ‘non-westerns’ as victims 
rather than fully fledged members of universal humanity, and a 
corresponding reluctance to critique right-wing religious ideologies. As 
Chetan Bhatt has put it (2006, 98-115): ‘Also of importance is the inert, 
innocent nature of the agency and subjectivity that left culturalism imparts 
to non-western subalterns and western diasporics, a kind of heroic, 
narcissistic, victimology that cannot name itself as such. In much 
multicultural theory, the diasporic subaltern is primarily a culturally-
described, infra-ethical victim rather than a subject fully capable of ethical 
existence and judgment.’ 
 
Conclusion 
In this essay, I have argued that it is important to defend some notion of 
universalism – universalism about humanity, on the one hand, and about 
women as well, in certain circumstances. I have given a number of reasons 
for these positions, and I have critiqued some proposed alternative 
theoretical perspectives. I have suggested that there are several ways of 
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defending universalism, one of which is the view that there are universal 
rights that apply to all, wherever and whomever they are. Sometimes, 
indeed, it will be important to use the notion of universal humanity to 
critique inappropriate applications of the notion of universal woman-
hood. 
 One reason, pertaining to this journal, why it is important to retain the 
notion of a right applying to all of humanity, despite its limitations, is the 
opportunity it offers to counter, for example, ‘sharia’ law, which ‘aims to 
replace the sovereignty of the people with the sovereignty of God, as 
revealed through the Sharia’ (see Ruthven 1997). According to a number 
of Iranians, gender apartheid has been the fundamental principle of their 
regime, based on a version of Sharia law. 
 The notion of human equality before the law is a useful device with 
which to challenge a view that sets out to enshrine into the constitution 
the view that men and women are ‘different types of human’ (Motahhari 
1990). There are many other positions analogous to this Iranian example, 
but the perspective of human rights that apply to all is useful to challenge 
any such view. 
 I would like to conclude the piece by suggesting why I personally 
believe that, in the end, it is the shared natural nature of all of us that 
constitutes our universal humanity. Human beings are natural beings. This 
need not be a reductive notion. Humans are not merely animals. But our 
animal nature is a deeply significant aspect of our being. We all share with 
the rest of the natural world a dynamic, evolving biological nature. This 
nature both encompasses all of humanity and also stresses the need on 
the part of humanity for a shared concern for the non-human nature from 
which we all derive. Humans differ from other animals, however, in one 
respect which is universal to all of us, which is that we are able to develop 
norms of justice and equality. Such norms ought to encourage us to 
respect the humanity and the flourishing of all members of the human 
species. Identity theorists, ‘performativity’ theorists and those who 
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believe in inter-sectionality all require universalising notions of justice and 
these notions are themselves, in my view, grounded in our common 
humanity. 
 Particularists, relativists and pluralists have criticised what has passed 
for universalism. Properly conceptualised, universalisms are neither 
Eurocentric nor partial. A universal view of nature need not offer a 
reductive and mechanistic view of human nature. Rather it could view all 
human beings as biological and natural beings but who are different from 
all other animals in having the ability both to commit horrendous crimes 
but also to recognise the rights of all to flourish. Although biology is shaped 
by race, class, sex etc. this does not make it any the less biological. 
Biological characteristics are themselves ‘performatively’ shaped by 
environment and culture.20 They are not exclusively ‘innate’. The same 
point applies in relation to any one of the categories. Each is shaped by all 
the others and yet it retains its distinctiveness. Reducing any one 
characteristic to any one of the others – the biological to the social or vice 
versa - involves a form of reductionism. Social reductionism is as much a 
form of reductionism as biological reductionism. We humans share some 
qualities with elements of the natural world from which we, as humans, 
have emerged but we are also uniquely able to recognise the harm that 
humans have done to this natural world. 
 When postmodernists and others critique what has passed as 
universalism they have derided it as an ‘“Enlightenment” conceit’. 
Unfortunately the perceived problems with some aspects of the 
‘Enlightenment’ model of the self have led to misguided and unfortunate 
challenges to the very notion of universalism about humanity. 
 Our universal humanity rests partly on biological realities but these 
need not, as has been illustrated here, be read in a reductive manner. Nor 
are they, as some have suggested they are, trivial qualities. Indeed, to the 
contrary, our shared basic biological needs are the bedrock set of needs 
that must be satisfied, as I have argued before, if humans are to be able to 
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do anything at all. The natural – biological and environmental – realities 
affecting all of us will, indeed, ultimately shape whether or not the human 
race as a whole continues to reproduce itself. 
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Notes 
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1 In various works of mine including my recent book Kierkegaard, Eve and 
Metaphors of Birth (2015). 
2 It should be noted that Gilroy himself did not opt for the ‘postmodern’ 
alternative to the Enlightenment ideal. His concept of the ‘black Atlantic’ was 
deliberately intended to cross cultures and nations and suggested a common 
‘diasporic’ identity. Neil Lazarus (1995, 323-339), however, has challenged the 
extent to which Gilroy’s ‘universalising’ imperative about the diasporic identity is 
actually universalizing.  
3 See also David Held’s, Introduction to Critical Theory (1980), Part Three, for a 
summary of critiques of these theories. 
4 These kinds of points have been made by Fanon in his major monograph, Black 
Skin, White Masks (1967). 
5 Mahmood, in her turn, argues that the language of rights, freedom and equality 
has contributed to undermining religious and cultural traditions that themselves 
enable certain groups of people to flourish. 
6 One famous example is the French Revolution which proclaimed to support the 
rights of ‘man’ but which explicitly excluded women from the scope of the public 
sphere (see Pateman 1989 and Werbner and Yuval-Davis 1999).  
7 A further common criticism of the human rights version of universalism is that 
it cannot decide between, for example, the competing rights of those who were 
and continue to be ‘pro’ choice versus those who campaigned against abortion. 
It has been argued that some in the ‘global south’ were being forced into 
reproduction controls. This was pointed out, for example, by Gayatri Spivak 
(1995, 3-5). 
8 In his magnum opus A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls hypothesized that 
principles of justice should be developed by people behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ 
about any of the qualities that differentiate them from others. 
9 A significant voice in the contemporary UK context is that of Tariq Modood, who 
offers a variant on some of the other theoretical perspectives, in his work 
Multiculturalism (2007). 
10 See Calder, op. cit, for an argument of this form. It ought to be pointed out that, 
although I am using the words ‘universalist’ and ‘particularist’, both words signify 
an idealised and general description of groups of people. Both are normative to 
the extent that they are attempting to specify significant commonalities between 
groups of people. 
11 See, for one example, the extensive work of Gill Hague and others, partly 
through The Centre for Gender and Violence Research at Bristol University. 
12 See also the work of Simon Thompson, 2006. 
13 Susan Bordo, quoting ‘a historian’ (1990, 133-56) 
14 It is also important to recognise the ground-breaking work of Judith Butler, who 
suggests that gender is a performative construction (Butler 1990). 
15 For some examples of this kind of argument, see Assiter (1999) and Gunarsson 
(2014). 
16 It doesn’t follow that this distinction is not also social and psychological. 
17 If it is biological, then, a third category should be added – that of ‘trans’ people. 
18 Richard Wright, in conversation with a journalist in 1946, in Wright, Kinnamon 
& Fabre (1993, 99). 
19 This claim was made at a conference in London, October 2014, organized by 
Maryam Namazie and others, on Secularism and Anti-Fundamentalism. 
 




20 The American Association of Physical Anthropologists make the following claim 
about this issue: ‘Biological differences between human beings reflect both 
hereditary factors and the influence of natural and social environments. In most 
cases, these differences are due to the interaction of both. The degree to which 
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